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TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
Ernest E. Figari, Jr.*
A. Erin Dwyer**
Donald Colleluori***
HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The reach of the Texas long-arm statute' continues to be the subject of
judicial measurement. The statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction
over a nonresident when the nonresident is doing business in Texas. 2 Doing
business includes a situation where a nonresident "contracts by mail or
otherwise [with a Texas resident] and either party is to perform the contract
in whole or in part in this state."' 3 A recent decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical, Ge-
osource, Inc.,4 is instructive where a plaintiff seeks to predicate personal ju-
risdiction on a contract basis.
In Jones, the plaintiff asserted a claim for the wrongful death of her hus-
band, leading to the contention that it arose out of a contract between a
French corporation and her husband's employer, a Delaware corporation
headquartered in Texas. After she instituted suit in Texas against the Dela-
ware corporation, that company, in turn, asserted a third-party claim against
the French corporation, effecting service under the Texas long-arm statute.
The contract relied upon for jurisdictional purposes contemplated joint ex-
ploration by the two corporations for hydrocarbon substance in the Republic
of Sudan. It obligated the Delaware corporation to provide certain equip-
ment and personnel for use in Sudan but did not specify their place of origin.
While the negotiation of the contract included a few communications sent to
and from Texas, it was negotiated primarily in the United Kingdom. More-
over, the parties signed the contract in the United Kingdom and it contained
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Method-
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1. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-45 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993)
(formerly TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1985).
2. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044 (Vernon 1986).
3. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042(1) (Vernon 1986).
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a choice of law provision requiring application of English law. The record
showed that when time for performance arrived, the Delaware corporation
chose to satisfy a significant part of its requirements through resort to per-
sonnel and equipment originating in Texas. In this connection, the plaintiff's
husband was recruited by the Delaware corporation in Texas and dispatched
to Sudan to assist with its performance under the contract. After personal
jurisdiction was challenged by the French corporation, the trial court
granted a dismissal and an appeal to the Fifth Circuit ensued.
Where a contract is asserted as the basis for personal jurisdiction, the
Fifth Circuit indicated that the place of contractual performance is the most
significant factor in determining whether due process is satisfied. 5 However,
with respect to performance under the joint exploration contract, the court
noted that the only Texas activity under it was the unilateral activity of the
Delaware corporation in using equipment and personnel from Texas. 6 The
court further observed that the place of contracting and the law governing
the contract, while not dispositive, are also relevant factors to be considered
in making such a jurisdictional determination. 7 Since an examination of the
critical factors did not implicate Texas, the court affirmed the dismissal of
the French corporation for lack of personal jurisdiction.8
Wenche Siemer v Learjet Acquisition Corp. ,9 another decision of the Fifth
Circuit, is an indication that due process considerations cannot be satisfied
solely by the qualification of a nonresident corporation to transact business
in the forum state and its corresponding appointment of an agent there to
receive service of process. The plaintiffs, all of whom were both residents of
European countries and the survivors of two pilots of an aircraft that
crashed in Egypt, sued the manufacturer of the aircraft in Texas. Prior to
suit, the manufacturer, which was a Delaware corporation headquartered in
Kansas, had qualified under the Texas Business Corporation Act to transact
business in Texas and appointed a Texas agent there to receive service on its
behalf. 10 When the plaintiffs commenced suit they effected service over the
manufacturer by serving its designated agent in Texas. The manufacturer
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In response, the plaintiffs
argued that the manufacturer's qualification and appointment of a service
agent in Texas was tantamount to "consent" to be sued there1' or, alterna-
5. Id. at 1068; see Barnstone v. Congregation Am Echad, 574 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir.
1978).
6. Id. at 1069-70; see Barnstone, 574 F.2d at 289.
7. Id. at 1069; see Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149, 151
(5th Cir. 1980).
8. Id. at 1069-70.
9. 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 122 L. Ed.2d 356 (1993); accord Ratliff v.
Cooper Lab., Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971).
10. When a foreign corporation has qualified under the Act to transact business in Texas
and has appointed an agent in the state to receive process on its behalf, the relevant statute
provides that "the registered agent so appointed ... shall be agents of such corporation upon
whom any process ... permitted by law to be served upon the corporation may be served."
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10(A) (Vernon 1980).
11. "The rationale behind the theory of consent is that in return for the privilege of doing
business in the state, and enjoying the same rights and privileges as a domestic corporation, the
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tively, was sufficient "presence" in the state to sustain jurisdiction over its
person.' 2 Overruling these arguments, the trial court granted the motion.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit resorted to a due process analysis,' 3 reasoning
that service could be sustained only if due process was satisfied "generally"' 4
or "specifically."' 5  Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument based on "consent,"
the court overlooked authority to the contrary' 6 and concluded that "a for-
eign corporation that properly complies with the Texas registration statute
only consents to personal jurisdiction where such jurisdiction is constitution-
ally permissible."' 7 Similarly, the court found that the manufacturer's ap-
pointment of an agent in Texas was not the equivalent of "presence" for
jurisdictional purposes, holding that "[a] registered agent, from any conceiv-
able perspective, hardly amounts to 'the general business presence' of a cor-
poration so as to sustain an assertion of general jurisdiction."' 8 Although
virtually conceding the lack of "special" jurisdiction, the plaintiffs argued
that "general" jurisdiction was nevertheless satisfied by the manufacturer's
qualification and appointment of an agent in Texas, even though their claim
did not arise out of any business it had conducted in Texas. ' 9 Rebuffing this
contention, the court concluded that "a foreign corporation that properly
complies with the Texas registration statute only consents to personal juris-
diction where such jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible."'20 Finding
insufficient minimum contacts with Texas, the court affirmed the dismissal
foreign corporation has consented to amenability to jurisdiction for purposes of all lawsuits
within the state." Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 520 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). See generally National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhert,
375 U.S. 311 (1964).
12. "[S]ervice upon a physically present defendant suffice[s] to confer jurisdiction, without
regard to whether the defendant was only briefly in the State or whether the cause of action
was related to his activities there." Burnham v. Supreme Court of Calif., 495 U.S. 604, 612
(1990).
13. 966 F.2d at 181-83. But see Burnham, 495 U.S. at 612-14.
14. " 'General jurisdiction' is personal jurisdiction based on a defendant's contacts with
the forum that are unrelated to the controversy. To exercise general jurisdiction, the court
must determine whether 'the contacts are sufficiently systematic and continuous as to support
a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction.' " Southmark Corp. v. Life Inv., Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 772
(5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
15. " 'Specific jurisdiction' . . . is personal jurisdiction based on contacts with the forum
that are related to the particular controversy. Even a single purposeful contact may in a
proper case be sufficient to meet the requirement of minimum contacts when the cause of
action arises from the contact." Id. (citation omitted).
16. See Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1270 n.21 (5th Cir. 1981) ("By virtue of
the theory of consent to jurisdiction implicit in Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 8.10, a foreign
corporation consents to amenability to jurisdiction for purposes of all lawsuits brought within
the state, whether or not the cause of action relates to activities within the state."); Goldman,
520 S.W.2d at 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) ("in return for the
privilege of doing business in this state, and enjoying the same rights and privileges as a domes-
tic corporation, the foreign corporation has consented to amenability to jurisdiction for pur-
poses of all lawsuits within the state.").
17. 966 F.2d at 183.
18. Id.
19. Id. While the manufacturer had conducted some unrelated business in Texas, these
contacts were modest and were themselves insufficient to support "general" jurisdiction. Id. at
181.




The recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Malaysia British Assur-
ance v. El Paso Reyco, Inc. 22 clarifies the "territory-of-coverage" approach to
the determination of personal jurisdiction which was recently adopted in
Texas.23 In outlining this approach, the supreme court had held that, in
determining whether a nonresident insurer has purposefully established min-
imum contacts with Texas, two significant factors are: "[(a)] the insurer's
awareness 'that it was responsible to cover losses arising from a substantial
subject of insurance regularly present' in the forum state, [and] [(b)] the na-
ture of the particular insurance contract and [its] coverage."' 24 In Malaysia
British Assurance, the supreme court reversed a lower court that had misap-
plied these tests to an alien insurer. 25
The alien reinsurer, a Malaysian company having no connection with
Texas, reinsured the nonresident primary insurer which, in turn, provided
insurance coverage to a Texas corporation. After the individual plaintiff, a
Texas resident, recovered a judgment against the insured Texas corporation,
the two joined together in a suit against the primary insurer on the primary
coverage. By the time they obtained judgment, however, the primary in-
surer was insolvent. Thereafter, the Texas plaintiffs targeted the Malaysian
reinsurer for satisfaction of their recovery. They sued the reinsurer in Texas
on its reinsurance agreement and effected service under the long-arm statute.
The alien reinsurer objected to personal jurisdiction, the trial court sustained
the challenge, and the plaintiffs perfected an appeal.
As framed by the court of appeals, the question was whether a Texas
court may exercise jurisdiction over an alien reinsurer whose only contact
with Texas was entering into a reinsurance agreement with a now insolvent
nonresident primary insurer, who had insured a Texas corporation against
whom there is an outstanding final judgment remaining unpaid. 26 Focusing
on the alien reinsurer's contract of reinsurance with the primary insurer,
which specified that such insurer would be writing casualty insurance within
the United States, the court of appeals concluded the reinsurer had the nec-
essary relationship with Texas to subject its person to Texas jurisdiction.27
Reversing the trial court, the court of appeals held that Texas courts were
21. Id. at 184.
22. 830 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
23. "In exercising jurisdiction [over alien insurance companies], the courts infer the neces-
sary contact from policy language defining the territory of coverage. In short, if the geographi-
cal scope of the coverage includes the forum state, then the court, having jurisdiction over the
insured, may exercise jurisdiction over the insurer as well." William C. Hoffman, Personal
Jurisdiction Over Alien Insurance Companies: The Territory-of-Coverage Rule, 26 Tort & In-
sur. L. J. 703, 703 (1991). See generally Ernest E. Figari, Jr., A. Erin Dwyer, & Don Col-
leluori, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1375, 1376-77 (1992)
[hereinafter Figari, 1992 Annual Survey].
24. Guardian Royal Exch. Assur., Ltd. v. English China Cays, 815 S.W.2d 223, 237 (Tex.
1991) (citation omitted); see Figari, 1992 Annual Survey, supra note 23, at 1376-77.
25. 830 S.W.2d 919, 920.
26. El Paso Reyco, Inc. v. Malaysia British Assurance, 808 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1991), rev'd, 830 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1992).
27. Id. at 530-31.
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obliged to assume jurisdiction.28
Disagreeing, the supreme court concluded that the court of appeals had
misfocused its attention on the primary insured's contacts with Texas, rather
than the Texas contacts of the Malaysian reinsurer being sued. Emphasizing
that under the reinsurance agreement the losses the Malaysian reinsurer was
obligated to cover were the losses by the nonresident primary insurer, not its
insureds, the supreme court concluded that "[t]his twice-removed contact
with Texas is not sufficient for in personam jurisdiction. '29
Service under the Texas long-arm statute is not complete until the Secre-
tary of State forwards process to the nonresident defendant. 30 In order to
establish the jurisdiction of the trial court over the defendant's person the
record must therefore affirmatively show that the process was forwarded. 31
This showing may be made by filing a certificate of mailing issued by the
Secretary of State. 32 In the case of an unreceptive defendant, the trial attor-
ney has been concerned with the question of whether a certificate indicating
that process was forwarded but returned "unclaimed" by the defendant sat-
isfied this service requirement. Answering in the negative, the court in
Barnes v. Frost Nat'l Bank 33 held that such service was incomplete and did
not satisfy the long-arm statute.34 Observing that "at a minimum the certifi-
cate of service must affirmatively show notice given," the court concluded
that "[a]n unclaimed letter from the Secretary of State's office can hardly
further the aim and objective of the long-arm statute, which is to provide
reasonable notice of the suit and an opportunity to be heard."' 35 Since an
earlier case36 had approved a long-arm service when the certificate showed
that process had been "refused," as opposed to "unclaimed," the court in
Barnes distinguished the two situations. Explaining that "[i]f a defendant
were to know of the existence of certified mail and refuse to accept it, this
would tend to show the defendant did in fact have notice;"' 37 however, if the
process is "unclaimed," the court reasoned that it could mean "that the
plaintiff gave the Secretary of State the wrong address for the defendant, in
which case the defendant would not receive notice" and "due process would
not be observed." 38
28. Id. at 531.
29. 830 S.W.2d at 921. The supreme court was careful to distinguish its holding from
Guardian Royal, where the insurer had issued a policy covering its insured's Texas subsidiary.
Id.
30. Whitney v. L&L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1973); see Ernest E. Figari,
Jr., Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 248 (1974).
31. 500 S.W.2d at 96.
32. See Vanguard Inv. v. Fireplaceman Inc., 641 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. 840 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, no writ).
34. Id. at 750.
35. Id.
36. BLS Limousine Serv., Inc. v. Buslease, Inc., 680 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (en banc). See generally Ernest E. Figari, Jr., Thomas A. Graves & A.
Erin Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 491, 495-96
(1986).




A relatively obscure provision of the Texas long-arm statute39 received
attention during the Survey period. Section 17.045 of that statute stipulates
that when process is delivered to the Secretary of State for forwarding to a
nonresident defendant, the process must contain a statement of the name
and address of the nonresident's "home or home office" to facilitate such
forwarding. 40 Boreham v. Hartsell4 ' recently considered this address re-
quirement as it related to an individual defendant. The record before the
court revealed that the Secretary of State was furnished with only the de-
fendant's address at "1800 West Cliff Drive, No. 17," and that he forwarded
process to that location. The plaintiff obtained a default judgment based on
this service, and the defendant sought to set it aside, arguing noncompliance
with the statutory provision. In response, the plaintiff contended that a
designation like "No. 17" in an address is a common method of referring to
an apartment and hence it could be inferred that, being an apartment, it was
the defendant's home address. Refusing to indulge in such an inference, the
appellate court concluded that nothing in the record showed that the address
furnished to the Secretary of State was the home or home office required by
the statute and set aside the judgment. 42
II. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Two cases during the Survey period, Laykin v. McFal 43 and N. H. Heli-
copters, Inc. v. Brown,44 addressed the availability of mandamus review of a
ruling on a special appearance and reached opposite conclusions. In Laykin,
the Amarillo court of appeals was confronted with a petition for writ of
mandamus seeking review of the trial court's denial of the defendant's spe-
cial appearance. Acknowledging the supreme court's recent admonition that
mandamus review is to be granted only sparingly, 45 the court nevertheless
concluded that precedent 46 permitted mandamus review of an erroneous
overruling of a special appearance in a personal jurisdiction context. 4 7 After
concluding mandamus review was appropriate, the court dismissed the suit
for lack of personal jurisdiction.48 Similarly, in Brown the Dallas court of
39. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
40. Id.
41. 826 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
42. Id. at 196-97; see Security Pac. Corp. v. Lupo, 808 S.W.2d 126, 127 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Bannigan v. Market St. Developers, Ltd., 766 S.W.2d
591, 593 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
43. 830 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ) (2-1 decision).
44. 841 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
45. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992).
46. See United Mexican States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1977) (mandamus
review of adverse ruling on "special appearance" permitted in suit against Mexico to consider
claim of sovereign immunity); Hutchings v. Biery, 723 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1987, no writ) (mandamus review of adverse ruling on "special appearance" denied in
parent-child proceeding to consider finding that jurisdiction of trial court continued from orig-
inal divorce proceeding). It is noteworthy that, although the defensive plea in both United
Mexican States and Hutchings was labeled a "special appearance," neither case dealt with a
challenge to personal jurisdiction.
47. 830 S.W.2d at 268.
48. Id. at 271.
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appeals was asked to accept mandamus review of the denial of a special ap-
pearance. Disagreeing with the decision of its sister court, the Dallas court
of appeals declined to entertain mandamus review, concluding that an ap-
peal after a final judgment was an adequate remedy. 49
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a,10 which governs special appearance
practice in Texas, was significantly amended in 1990. 5 1 One court during
the Survey period ruled that one of these amendments serves to shift the
burden of proof at a special appearance hearing from the defendant to the
plaintiff, provided a proper special appearance has been filed.52 Previously,
it was well established that the burden of proof in state court was on the
defendant to show that he was not amenable to process. 53 Pointing to the
provision in the amended rule directing the trial court to determine the spe-
cial appearance on the basis of, among other things, "the pleadings," 5 4 the
court concluded that the effect of this language was to shift the burden of
proof to the plaintiff. According to the court, it was now clear that "a sworn
special appearance which sets out sufficient facts to show a lack of jurisdic-
tion will establish a prima facie case of no jurisdiction. '55
Franklin v. Geotechnical Serv., Inc. 56 is a warning to the trial practitioner
that some Texas courts may relax the rules of evidence for a special appear-
ance hearing. Counsel for the defendant read excerpts from a deposition at
the special appearance hearing but did not enter the entire deposition into
evidence. Apparently the trial court relied on the entire deposition and dis-
missed the defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the court
of appeals looked to Rule 120a which directs the trial court to "determine
the special appearance on the basis of the pleadings, any stipulations made
by and between the parties, such affidavits and attachments as may be filed
by the parties, the results of discovery processes, and any oral testimony. '5 7
49. 841 S.W.2d at 426. It should be noted that the court in Brown distinguished the
precedent relied upon in Laykin because they were atypical of special appearances and
presented factors which militated against the adequacy of a remedy by appeal. Id. at 426 n. 1.
50. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
51. See generally Ernest E. Figari, Jr., A. Erin Dwyer & Donald Colleluori, Texas Civil
Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 73, 77-78 (1991) [hereinafter Figari, 1991
Annual Survey].
52. See Martinez v. Valencia, 824 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
This decision brings the Texas practice in line with the procedure followed by the federal
courts. See, e.g., Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner Elec. Co., 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir.
1973) ("[pilaintiff has the burden of proving that defendant is amenable to process under the
state's jurisdiction statute"); Product Promotions, Inc. v, Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 489-90 (5th
Cir. 1974) ("the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court has the burden of
establishing that jurisdiction exists"). See generally Ernest E. Figari, Jr., Texas Civil Proce-
dure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 265 n.3 (1975).
53. See, e.g., Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1982)
(defendant must negate all bases of personal jurisdiction); Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d
52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ refd n.r.e.) (burden of proof and persuasion on
nonresident defendant); Taylor v. American Emery Wheel Works, 480 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, no writ) (nonresident defendant bears burden of pleading
and proving lack of jurisdiction).
54. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a(3).
55. 824 S.W.2d at 723.
56. 819 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
57. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a(3) (emphasis added).
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SMU LAW REVIEW
Observing that since the deposition was the result of discovery processes and
was a pleading, inasmuch as it had been attached as an exhibit to a brief in
the trial court, the court concluded that the entire deposition was before the
trial court for its consideration of the special appearance. 58 Accordingly,
relying on the entire deposition, the court concluded that the evidence before
the trial court supported the dismissal.59
While Rule 120a does not directly address whether a jury may be im-
paneled to decide issues underlying a decision on a special appearance, the
usual practice is for the trial court to decide such matters. Perhaps sus-
taining the obvious, the court in Board of County Comm 'rs v. Amarillo Hosp.
Dist. 61 overruled an argument by the defendant that its request for a jury
trial at a special appearance hearing should have been granted. 62 The court
reiterated that the "determination of personal jurisdiction is a matter for the
court, not the jury."' 63
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
A number of decisions during the Survey period considered challenges to
service of process on the basis of inadvertent errors occurring in the course
of service. In McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Futrell" the court of appeals reviewed
the propriety of a $1.85 million default judgment obtained on the basis of
returns that the process servers did not verify. In this regard, Rule 107,65
which prescribes the requirements of a return after service, mandates that
"[tlhe return of citation by an authorized person shall be verified."' 66 Each
of the returns in question contained a certification at the bottom by the pro-
cess server that citation had been delivered to the named defendant; how-
ever, there was nothing on the return or attached to it that could be
considered a verification of such statement. Finding this noncompliance
with Rule 107 to be fatal, the supreme court set aside the default judgment.67
Similarly, in Wood v. Brown68 the supreme court invalidated a service by
publication due to an inadvertent error and set aside a default judgment. 69
The plaintiff, after attempting personal service on the defendant, sought to
effect service by publication. The rule specifying the procedure for issuance
58. 819 S.W.2d at 223.
59. Id.
60. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a. Emphasizing the type of proof that may be considered in
deciding a special appearance, the rule states that "[t]he court shall determine the special ap-
pearance on the basis of the pleadings, any stipulations made by and between the parties, such
affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties, the results of discovery processes, and
any oral testimony." Id. at 120a(3) (emphasis added).
61. 835 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ).
62. Id. at 121.
63. Id.; see Ainsworth v. Oil City Brass Works, 271 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1954, no writ).
64. 823 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
65. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107.
66. Id.
67. 823 S.W.2d at 415.
68. 819 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 800.
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of service by publication, Rule 109,70 requires that before a clerk shall issue
service by publication, the plaintiff or his attorney must file an affidavit stat-
ing "that the residence of [the] . . .defendant is unknown," "that such de-
fendant is a transient person," or "that such defendant is absent from or is a
nonresident of the State." Noting that the plaintiff's attorney's affidavit
failed to contain any of the required statements, the supreme court held that
the plaintiff's service by publication was defective and would not support the
default judgment based on it.7 1
Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Samaria Baptist Church7 2 highlighted an
obscure statute which permits public officials to perform service by certified
mail in lieu of registered mail in those instances where registered mail has
been prescribed. The plaintiff sued a non-profit corporation and effected ser-
vice on the defendant by serving the Secretary of State under the Texas Non-
Profit Corporation Act.73 The Secretary of State forwarded process to the
defendant by certified mail, but the letter enclosing process was returned
"unclaimed." The trial court entered a default judgment when the defend-
ant failed to appear. The defendant later appeared and challenged the de-
fault judgment. Reversing the default judgement and ordering a new trial,
the court of appeals held that the use of certified mail was not in strict com-
pliance with the Act.74 In denying an application for writ of error, the
supreme court noted that the court of appeals had incorrectly concluded the
Secretary of State could not utilize certified mail. The supreme court
pointed to article 29c, which expressly authorizes a public official "to use
certified mail with return receipt requested, in lieu of registered mail in all
instances where registered mail has heretofore been required. '75 Neverthe-
less, the supreme court agreed with the result, observing that the Secretary
of State had forwarded process to the wrong address, utilizing "1201 Bassie"
instead of "1201 Bessie." For this reason, the supreme court denied the peti-
tioner's application for writ of error. 76
IV. PLEADINGS
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13,7 7 aimed at deterring the filing of frivo-
lous pleadings,78 was the subject of judicial attention during the Survey pe-
riod. Rule 13 has always provided that the signatures of attorneys or parties
70. TEX. R. Civ. P. 109.
71. 819 S.W.2d at 800.
72. 840 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
73. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-2.07(B) (Vernon 1980).
74. Samaria Baptist Church v. Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 832 S.W.2d 760, 761-62
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
75. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 29c (Vernon 1969).
76. 840 S.W.2d at 382-83.
77. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
78. See generally Anthony Benedetto & David Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices
(Including the Frivolous Suit Question), 1987 ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL IN-
STITUTE: CIVIL PROCEDURE 1988-RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-2 to F-12 (discuss-
ing legislative history, purpose, and effect of Rule 13); Elaine A. Carlson, Procedural Changes
Mandated by the 1988 Rule Changes, 6 ADVOC. 22, 23 (1987) (discussing frivolous suit deter-
rence purpose of Rule 13).
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on a court filing certify that they have read it and that the filing "is not
groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the pur-
pose of harassment."' 79 The rule defines groundless as "no basis in law or
fact and not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, modifica-
tion or reversal of existing law." °80 Sanctions shall be imposed by the court,
upon motion or its own initiative, upon either or both the person who signed
a filing in violation of the rule and the represented party.81 Joining with an
earlier Texas case8 2 and following the lead of pertinent federal authority,8 3
the court in Rodriguez v. State Dep't of Highways84 held that appellate re-
view of an order granting or denying relief under Rule 13 should be by way
of an "abuse of discretion" standard.8 5
Notably, under Rule 13 a trial court may not impose sanctions except for
good cause and, if imposed, the court must set forth the particulars of the
good cause in its sanctions order.8 6 Heeding this admonition in the rule,
several cases87 during the Survey period held that Rule 13 imposes a duty on
the trial court to point out with particularity the facts on which sanctions
are based and that a failure to do so will invalidate the sanctions order.
Finally, one court recently held that when the sanctions awarded under
Rule 13 are in the form of recovery of attorneys' fees, proof of the necessity
79. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13; see also FED. R. Civ. P. II (analogous federal rule governing
signing of pleadings). See generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FED. PRAC. &
PROC. §§ 1331-35 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing federal rule analogous to TEX. R. Civ. P. 13).
80. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. Rule 13 may lead to a resurgence in special exception practice in
Texas. Traditionally, a special exception may be used, among other things, to force the
pleader to allege all essential elements of his cause of action. See, e.g., Covington v. Associated
Employers Lloyds, 195 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1946, writ ref'd). Inter-
acting with special exception practice, Rule 13 prohibits a pleader from making a statement in
his pleading known to be groundless and false and authorizes the imposition of sanctions if a
violation occurs. Thus, if an essential allegation known to be without evidentiary support is
omitted from a pleading, the pleader might avoid the threat of Rule 13. As a result, special
exception practice may be utilized to compel the full pleading of a cause of action so as to
subject a previously omitted allegation to the scrutiny of Rule 13.
81. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. Under Rule 13, the trial court may impose sanctions against the
offending party which include disallowance of further discovery, assessment of discovery ex-
penses or taxable costs, establishment of designated facts, refusing to allow the disobedient
party to support or oppose claims or defenses, striking pleadings, dismissal of claims, rendition
of a default judgment, and contempt. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b) (miscellaneous sanctions);
TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b)(6) (contempt).
82. See Home Owners Funding Corp. v. Scheppler, 815 S.W.2d 884, 888-89 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
83. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990).
84. 818 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
85. Id. at 504.
86. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
87. See Zarsky v. Zurich Mgmt., Inc., 829 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, no writ) ("Rule 13 imposes a duty on the trial court to point out with particularity
the acts or omissions on which sanctions are based"); GTE Communications Sys. Corp. v.
Curry, 819 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ) ("Rule 13's requirement
that the trial court state the particulars for the good cause found for imposing sanctions is
mandatory"); Kahn v. Garcia, 816 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no
writ); but see Powers v. Palacios, 771 S.W.2d 716, 718-19 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989,
writ denied); cf Cloughly v. NBC Bank-Seguin, 773 S.W.2d 652, 656-57 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1989, writ denied) (better practice is for trial court to specify the factual basis for
good cause which supports its sanctions order).
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or reasonableness of such fees is not required. s8
V. SEALING OF COURT RECORDS
The presumption at common law is well established that all court records
are open to the public.89 Hence, when a party sought to have court records
sealed, such party had to satisfy certain procedural and substantive require-
ments in order to overcome this presumption of openness. 90 These require-
ments, being a matter of common law, were not always readily discernable. 91
The legislature, apparently attempting to define such requirements, enacted
a statute92 directing the Texas Supreme Court to establish procedures for the
sealing of court records. Responding to this mandate, the Texas Supreme
Court adopted Rule 76a,93 which became effective September 1, 1990 and
governs the sealing of court records. 94 Rule 76a spawned a number of judi-
cial decisions during the Survey period which are of significance to the trial
practitioner.
Eli Lilly and Co. v. Marshall,95 a decision of the Texas Supreme Court, is
an admonition that before a trial court may make a ruling on a party's mo-
tion to seal court records under Rule 76a, the trial court must conduct a
hearing and render a decision in compliance with the rule. The plaintiffs
filed a products liability suit against the manufacturer of an antidepressant
drug and, in the course of attempted discovery, the manufacturer filed a
motion with the trial court seeking an order restricting disclosure of any
documents it had to produce concerning the drug. The manufacturer based
its motion on the assertion of a trade secret. At the hearing on the motion,
the plaintiffs disputed whether Rule 76a applies to a trade secret and the trial
court refused to address the merits of that claim. After the trial court denied
the manufacturer's motion, it sought review of the ruling by mandamus.
The supreme court observed that, while the rule's definition of "court
records" specifically excludes "discovery in cases originally initiated to pre-
88. Glass v. Glass, 826 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
89. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
90. See Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802 (11th Cir. 1983) ("proper notice" to the
public required); In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983) (public
must be allowed a "reasonable opportunity to present their claims").
91. See Lloyd Doggett, Rule 76a-Sealing Court Records, 9 ADVOC. 143 (June 1990)
[hereinafter Doggett].
92. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.010 (Vernon Supp. 1991). The statute provides
that "[tihe supreme court shall adopt rules establishing guidelines for the courts of this state to
use in determining whether in the interest of justice the records in a civil case, including settle-
ments, should be sealed." See also Elaine A. Carlson, Procedure Update: 1990 Amendments to
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellate Practice, 9 ADvoc 223, 226 (Oct. 1990) [herein-
after Carlson].
93. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a; see generally Doggett, supra note 91, at 143-48; Carlson, supra
note 92, at 226-27; see generally Figari, 1991 Annual Survey, supra note 51, at 84-88.
94. The Texas Supreme Court adopted rule 76a over the dissent of two justices who de-
scribed the rule as the most controversial of any in the history of the court. See Changes to
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and Texas Rules of Civil
Evidence, 53 TEX. B.J. 589, 590 (1990).
95. 829 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. 1992).
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serve bona fide trade secrets,"'9 6 the rule "does not mean that access to trade
secrets cannot be limited in other types of litigation."' 97 Thus, the supreme
court held that, "[r]egardless of the cause of action, a properly proven trade
secret is an interest that should be considered in making the determination
under Rule 76a" and, accordingly, "the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to conduct a hearing and render a decision on the motion in compli-
ance with Rule 76a." 98
In Chandler v. Hyundai Motor Co. ,99 expanding on its earlier decision in
this area, the supreme court held that the definition of "court records" under
rule 76a encompasses "filed discovery" in a suit, as well as discovery not
filed of record, provided it concerns matters that have "a probable adverse
effect upon the general public health or safety."'0
Rule 76a also modifies the former intervention practice in this area,' 0 '
stipulating that "[a]ny person may intervene as a matter of right at any time
before or after judgment to seal or unseal records."' 102 A recent decision of
the Austin court of appeals, Public Citizen v. Insurance Sers. Office, Inc., 103
is a warning to a potential intervenor in a rule 76a proceeding that it cannot
be slow to assert its rights. The state filed an antitrust suit in 1988 against
several insurance companies and, to expedite the discovery process, the par-
ties agreed to conduct discovery under an agreed protective order. The or-
der permitted any party to designate as confidential any document that the
party believed contained protectible information. The order restricted ac-
cess to the documents designated confidential to specific individuals and pro-
hibited their use for any purpose except in preparing and trying the suit.
Two years later Rule 76a was adopted and became effective.
As noted previously, Rule 76a applies to court records filed or exchanged
after its effective date in suits pending on its effective date. i04 Court records,
for purposes of the rule, include all documents "filed in connection with any
matter before any civil court,"' 0 5 as well as any settlement agreements and
discovery not filed of record, provided they concern matters that have "a
probable adverse effect upon the general public health or safety, . . . the
96. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(c) (emphasis added).
97. 829 S.W.2d at 158 (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. 829 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. 1992).
100. Id. at 775.
101. See Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 730 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1987); Express-News Corp. v. Spears, 766
S.W.2d 885 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ). See generally Doggett, supra note 91, at
145 n.18.
102. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(7); see Doggett, supra note 91, at 145.
103. 824 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
104. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(9). In this regard, one authority noted that "[c]ourt records
exchanged in those cases [i.e., cases pending on the effective date of the rule] after that date are
subject to the rule's provisions even if covered by a prior sealing or protective order. Moreover,
any motions in a pending case to alter a sealing order that has been issued prior to September 1
are governed by the new rule." Doggett, supra note 91, at 146 (emphasis added). Rule 76a
expressly states it does not apply to any court records sealed in an action in which a final
judgment had been entered before its effective date. TEX. R. Ov. P. 76a(9).
105. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(a); see Doggett, supra note 91, at 144-45.
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administration of public office, . . . or the operation of government." 0 6
Subsequently, the state filed a motion with the trial court seeking to be
relieved of the protective order in the future, contending it was contrary to
Rule 76a and, moreover, that the insurance companies had been abusing the
order. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion and, while not a
party, a consumer group and potential intervenor received advance notice
and appeared there as an observer. The consumer group did not, however,
seek to participate in the hearing. After the hearing the trial court vacated
the protective order as to all documents filed or exchanged after the rule's
effective date but permitted the order to control documents exchanged
before that date.107
Dissatisfied with the trial court's ruling, the consumer group sought to
intervene in the proceeding and, at the same time, moved for a modification
of the ruling to the extent it allowed any discovery to remain sealed.
Although the trial court permitted the intervention, the court denied the
remainder of the relief sought by the consumer group.10 8 In affirming the
trial court, the court of appeals relied on the provision in rule 76a stating
that "[a]n order sealing or unsealing court records shall not be reconsidered
on motion of any party or intervenor who had actual notice of the hearing
preceding issuance of the order, without first showing changed circum-
stances materially affecting the order."' 0 9 According to the court, this pro-
vision "prevents an interested non-party such as [the consumer group] from
waiting on the sidelines until a court issues an order, and then, if dissatisfied
with the outcome, intervening and forcing the parties ... to relitigate the
issue."'I 10
VI. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
Establishing a new standard that significantly increases the likelihood of
disqualification motions, the court in Clarke v. R uffino 1 disqualified a firm
from representing a former client's adversary without proof of a substantial
relationship between the current and prior representations. Under the Texas
rules formerly governing disciplinary conduct,' 12 a party seeking to disqual-
ify his adversary's counsel on the basis of a prior attorney-client relationship
was required to establish that the factual matters involved in the prior repre-
sentation were so related to the facts in the pending litigation that a genuine
threat existed that confidences revealed to his former counsel would be di-
106. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(b)-(c). The definition of court records contained in the rule,
however, expressly excludes documents filed en camera to obtain a discovery ruling, docu-
ments to which access is restricted by law, or documents filed in an action under the Texas
Family Code. TEX. R. Cxv. P. 76a(2)(a)(1), (2) & (3).
107. 824 S.W.2d at 812.
108. Id.
109. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(7).
110. 824 S.W.2d at 813.
111. 819 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.).




vulged to his present adversary.1 3 The court in Ruffino held that this "sub-
stantial relationship" test was no longer the exclusive ground for
disqualification in cases alleging prior representation.114 Instead, the new
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct" 5 set forth an additional
basis for disqualification in such circumstances.'16
The court in Ruffino acknowledged that Rule 1.09 of the new disciplinary
rules continues to proscribe representation adverse to a former client if the
representation involves a matter substantially related to the prior representa-
tion. 17 According to the court, however, representation adverse to the for-
mer client is additionally prohibited if, in reasonable probability, the new
representation will involve a violation of the lawyer's obligations of confiden-
tiality to his former client." 18 Rule 1.05, which sets forth those obligations,
defines "confidential information" as both privileged and unprivileged infor-
mation. 19 Moreover, "unprivileged client information" includes "all infor-
mation relating to a client or furnished by the client ... during the course of
or by reason of the representation of the client."' 120 Applying these defini-
tions literally, but without discussing what would constitute a violation of
the confidentiality requirements of Rule 1.05, the Ruffino court concluded
that the law firm was subject to disqualification simply because it obtained
"confidential" information about its former client by virtue of the prior rep-
resentation. 121 While perhaps unintended by the court, the result of its rea-
soning appears to be the mandatory disqualification of counsel in all cases
involving representation adverse to a former client. The court's ruling in
this regard probably constitutes dictum, however, because the court also
held under the facts of the case that the current and former representations
were substantially related. 122
VII. VENUE
Section 15.064(b) of the Texas venue statute123 provides that transfer of a
case to a county of improper venue shall constitute reversible error on ap-
peal. The statute is silent, however, about cases in which a lawsuit is origi-
113. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. 1989).
114. 819 S.W.2d at 950.
115. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, STATE BAR RULES art. X, § 9 (Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Conduct) (Vernon Supp. 1992) [hereinafter TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF.
CONDUCT] (located in the pocket part for Volume 3 of the Texas Government Code in title 2,
subtitle G app., following § 83.006 of the Government Code).
116. 819 S.W.2d at 950.
117. Id. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, Rule 1.09(a) (Vernon Supp.
1992).
118. 819 S.W.2d at 950. Rule 1.09(a)(3) proscribes representation adverse to a former cli-
ent if the representation in reasonable probability will involve a violation of TEXAS DISCIPLI-
NARY RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.05.
119. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, Rule 1.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
120. Id.
121. 819 S.W.2d at 950-51.
122. Id. at 951.
123. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986) ("if venue was im-
proper it shall in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible error").
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nally brought in a county of proper venue but is erroneously transferred to
another county in which venue is also proper.' 24 Earlier cases interpreting
the statute concluded by implication that a trial court's erroneous venue rul-
ing in these latter circumstances was harmless. 125 The court in Marantha
Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Prods. Co. 126 disagreed, holding that a plaintiff's
right to prosecute his suit in the county in which he rightfully brought it is a
fundamental right that is not susceptible to a harmless error analysis.1 27
The plaintiff in Marantha Temple sued numerous corporations for damage
to its property allegedly caused by defendants' negligent contamination of
the environment. Although plaintiff's property was situated in Chambers
County, where the alleged releases of contaminants by the defendants also
occurred, the plaintiff commenced its action in Harris County. According to
the appellate court, venue was proper in Harris County because many of the
defendants were foreign corporations who maintained registered agents
there.'2 8 Under the joinder provision of the venue statute, 129 the Harris
County court also had venue of all other claims properly joined against the
remaining defendants, unless a mandatory venue exception was raised.1 30
After examining the plaintiff's petition, the appellate court rejected defend-
ants' argument that the suit was governed by the mandatory venue exception
for suits involving title to land, which would have justified the suit's transfer
to Chambers County.1 3 1
The defendants further contended on appeal that any error in transferring
the suit was harmless because venue was also proper in Chambers County.
Although the court conceded that venue would have been proper in Cham-
bers County if the plaintiff had initially brought the suit there, it still con-
cluded that the error in transferring venue there was not harmless. 3 2
According to the court, the plaintiff loses his valuable right to choose the
suit's forum whenever a trial court wrongly transfers venue, even when the
case is transferred to a county of proper venue.1 33 The court also observed
that its holding would guard against the forum shopping that occurs when a
124. Id.
125. E.g., Lewis v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 786 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989,
writ denied); see also Flores v. Arrieta, 790 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ
denied) (dictum); discussed in Figari 1991 Annual Survey, supra note 51, at 91-92.
126. 833 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
127. Id. at 742.
128. Id. at 738. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.037 (Vernon 1986).
129. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.061 (Vernon 1986) provides that a court
has venue of all properly joined claims against multiple defendants so long as the court has
venue of an action or claim against any one defendant and a mandatory venue exception does
not apply.
130. 833 S.W.2d at 738.
131. Id. at 738-39. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (Vernon 1986) is a
mandatory venue exception that requires all suits for recovery of real property or to quiet title
to be brought in the county in which all or part of the property is located. This venue provi-
sion applies, however, only when the suit directly involves a question of title to land, and the
nature of the suit must be determined solely from the facts alleged and the relief sought in
plaintiff's petition. Stiba v. Bowers, 756 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no
writ).
132. 833 S.W.2d at 740.
133. Id. at 741.
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party intentionally asserts faulty, invalid grounds for a change of venue from
one permissible county to another permissible county which he perceives as
more favorable. ' 34
The decision in Marantha Temple also clarified one of the procedural re-
quirements relating to proof of disputed venue facts. Rule 87 provides that
all properly pleaded venue facts "shall be taken as true unless specifically
denied by the adverse party." 135 Although some of the defendants in
Marantha Temple had denied "those venue facts pleaded in Plaintiff's Origi-
nal Petition that purport to establish venue in Harris County," 136 the court
refused to accept these statements as specific denials that would trigger the
requirement of further proof by plaintiff of disputed venue facts. 137 Instead,
the court held that a "specific denial" of a venue fact requires that the fact
itself be specifically denied. 138 Accordingly, because none of the defendants
had specifically denied that it was a foreign corporation with a registered
agent in Harris County, the plaintiff was not required to make prima facie
proof of that fact under Rule 87.139
VIII. LIMITATIONS
Several cases during the Survey period concerned the statute of limitations
for legal malpractice suits. In Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins,'40 for exam-
ple, the Texas Supreme Court held that when an attorney commits malprac-
tice in the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the
statute of limitations on the malpractice claim is tolled until all appeals in
the underlying litigation are exhausted.14' In joining other jurisdictions 42
that have adopted "this well-reasoned rule,"' 43 the court observed that a
cause of action for legal malpractice normally accrues when the client sus-
tains a legal injury or, in cases governed by the discovery rule, when the
client discovers or should have discovered the facts establishing his cause of
action. 44 When an attorney commits malpractice while providing legal
services in connection with ongoing litigation, however, "the legal injury and
discovery rules can force the client into adopting inherently inconsistent liti-
134. Id.
135. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a).
136. 833 S.W.2d at 740.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a).
140. 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991).
141. Id. at 157.
142. See, e.g., Bonanno v. Potthoff, 527 F.Supp. 561, 565 (N.D. Il. 1981) (applying Illinois
law); Amfac Dist. Corp. v. Miller, 673 P.2d 792, 793 (Ariz. 1983); see also cases cited at 821
S.W.2d at 157 n.5.
143. 821 S.W.2d at 157.
144. Id. at 156; see Smith v. McKinney, 792 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (legal injury rule); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex.
1988) (discovery rule); see Ernest E. Figari, Jr., Thomas A. Graves & A. Erin Dwyer, Texas




gation postures in the underlying case and in the malpractice case."' 145 An
"exhaustion of appeals" rule eliminates this untenable conflict by tolling lim-
itations for the second cause of action throughout the pendency of the first
suit. 14 6 In reaching this conclusion, the court also analogized to other
cases 147 in which the limitations period is tolled while a party is prevented
from exercising his legal remedy due to the pendency of other legal
proceedings. 148
Two cases decided after Hughes expanded on its holding. In Washington
v. Georges,149 the court concluded that the tolling rule set forth in Hughes
applied even if a party did not perfect an appeal in the underlying suit in
which his attorney committed the malpractice.' 50 In the court's view, all
appeals had not been exhausted so long as an appeal could still be perfected;
thus, the limitations period did not begin to run until the time for perfecting
an appeal had expired. 151 In Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Brown, 15 2 the Texas
Supreme Court extended the tolling rule it announced in Hughes to a claim
alleging that an attorney's malpractice resulted in a wrongful foreclosure
action by a third-party against the attorney's client. 53 For purposes of the
tolling rule, the court could see no distinction between malpractice commit-
ted during pending litigation and malpractice that resulted in ensuing litiga-
tion. 154 In both situations, said the court, the viability of the second cause of
action depended on the outcome of the first.' 55 Accordingly, the statute of
limitations on the malpractice claim was tolled until the wrongful foreclo-
sure action was finally resolved. 156
Rowntree v. Hunsuckert 57 involved the limitations provision contained in
the Texas health care statute. 58 The plaintiff was referred to the defendant
physician in October 1985 for hypertension. The defendant performed a
physical examination during plaintiff's first visit and prescribed medication
for her elevated blood pressure. The plaintiff returned to defendant's office
on several occasions over the course of the following year either for unre-
lated conditions or to have her blood pressure checked. Although plaintiff's
last visit with the defendant was in September 1986, she continued to take
145. 821 S.W.2d at 156.
146. Id. at 156-57.
147. See, e.g., Walker v. Hanes, 570 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (limitations tolled while prior submission of same case was being ap-
pealed); Cavitt v. Amsler, 242 S.W. 246, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1922, writ dism'd w.o.j.)
(limitations on suit for dividends tolled while suit to determine ownership of stock was being
appealed).
148. 821 S.W.2d at 157.
149. 837 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
150. Id. at 147.
151. Id.
152. 821 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).




157. 833 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1992).
158. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (two year statute
of limitations on health care claims).
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blood pressure medication for more than a year after that date pursuant to a
prescription that the defendant agreed to refill. In January 1988, plaintiff
suffered a debilitating stroke due to an occluded carotid artery. On October
30, 1989, plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant had negligently failed to
diagnose her occluded artery during his treatment of her for high blood
pressure.
The issue on appeal was whether plaintiff's taking medication pursuant to
the prescription refills constituted a "course of treatment" absent any other
concomitant medical care.' 59 The health care limitations statute requires an
action to be filed within two years from either the occurrence of the breach
or tort giving rise to the claim or the date the medical treatment that is the
subject of the claim is completed.' 6° According to the supreme court in
Rowntree, "the date of last treatment is relevant only if a course of treatment
has been established for the condition that is the subject of the claim."1 6'
The plaintiff in the suit did not allege, however, that the defendant's course
of treatment was the direct cause of her injury. Nor did she otherwise allege
a course of treatment for the condition made the basis of her claim so that
the statute of limitations could run from the last date of such treatment.
Instead, plaintiff complained that the defendant breached a duty to perform
the proper examinations from which he should have detected the occluded
arteries. The defendant could have breached this duty, according to the
court, only on those occasions when he had an opportunity to perform an
examination.1 62 Because plaintiff's last visit to the defendant, which was the
latest opportunity he would have had to breach any such duty, occurred
more than two years prior to the commencement of the suit, plaintiff's claim
was barred by limitations. 163
Finally, the court in Martinez v. Windsor Park Dev. Co. '6 held that the
term "holiday" as used in the limitations statute 165 includes any day on
which the clerk's office is officially closed or that the commissioner's court
has declared to be a holiday in the county in which the suit is pending. 166
The court's decision was all but compelled by its identical holding earlier in
the term 167 with respect to Rule 4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 168
Limitations on the plaintiff's personal injury action in Martinez expired on
159. 833 S.W.2d at 104.
160. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1992); see Kimball v.
Brothers, 741 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. 1987).
161. 833 S.W.2d at 105.
162. Id. at 108.
163. Id. In so holding, the court rejected the court of appeals' holding that limitations was
extended by plaintiff's taking of medication. Id. at 107. According to the court, a rule that
extended limitations until all authorized prescription refills had been taken would be unwork-
able and supplant the fixed limitations period established by the legislature with a period that
is selected by the patient. Id.
164. 833 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1992).
165. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.072 states that the period for filing suit is
extended to include the next day that county offices are open for business whenever the last
day of a limitations period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday.
166. 833 S.W.2d at 951.
167. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Villareal, 829 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1992).
168. TEX. R. Civ. P. 4.
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April 13, 1990, and because the Bexar County Commissioners Court had
ordered the courthouse closed on that date in observance of Good Friday,
plaintiff's action filed the following Monday was still timely.' 69
IX. DISCOVERY
A. DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
Depositions were the subject of a number of decisions during the Survey
period. The Texas Supreme Court held in Kennedy v. Eden170 that a trial
court's protective order prohibiting a certain person from attending a deposi-
tion was overly broad to the extent it also forever prohibited that person
from discussing the case with anyone other than the attorneys of record.17'
Without expressing an opinion on whether such an order would ever be au-
thorized, the court stated that there was no justification for the order in the
circumstances of the case before it.172 The court of appeals in Smith,
Wright, & Weed, P.C. v. Stone 7 3 directed the trial judge to vacate an order
quashing, on relevancy grounds, a notice to take the deposition of the plain-
tiffs' attorney.' 74 And in Jones v. Colley,'75 the court approved of a party
playing an edited version of a videotaped deposition at trial. 176 The court
noted that there is no rule requiring a deposition to be read or played in
sequence, and a party has the right to present evidence in the manner he
believes is most persuasive, "provided that it does not convey a distinctly
false impression."' 177
Fitzgerald v. Rogers' 78 involved a court order requiring a defendant to
execute an authorization form allowing the plaintiff to obtain information
regarding the defendant from financial institutions. The court of appeals
recognized that a party is deemed under Rule 166b(2)(b) 179 to have within
his possession, custody, or control documents that he has a right to obtain
from a third party.' 80 However, where the response to plaintiff's document
request stated that the defendant had no financial statements or credit appli-
cations, and the plaintiff had not impeached that assertion in any way, the
plaintiff was not entitled to an authorization permitting financial institutions
to release information about the defendant.' 8'
169. 833 S.W.2d at 951.
170. 837 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. 1992).
171. Id. at 98-99.
172. Id. at 99.
173. 818 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding).
174. Id. at 928-29.
175. 820 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied).
176. Id. at 866.
177. Id. (emphasis original). The court cited as obvious examples of what it would con-
sider objectionable editing techniques any attempt to introduce partial answers or to mismatch
questions and answers. Id. at n.3.
178. 818 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no writ).
179. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(b).
180. Fitzgerald, 818 S.W.2d at 895 n.5.
181. Id. at 895-96.
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B. PRIVILEGES AND EXEMPTIONS
The Texas Supreme Court ruled in Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v.
Caldwell' 82 that the work product privilege is not limited to documents pre-
pared in connection with the particular case in which discovery is sought,
but is instead continuing in nature. 8 3 The court noted that the primary
purpose of the work product doctrine is to provide protection for any attor-
ney's thought processes in litigation, a purpose that would be defeated if the
privilege was limited to the particular case. ' 8 4 Moreover, the court cited two
additional justifications for its conclusion. First, if the rule were otherwise,
it would be at odds with the attorney-client privilege, which is not limited to
the individual case in which the privileged communication occurs.' 8 5 Sec-
ond, a party that is a frequent litigant must be allowed to develop an overall
legal strategy.' 8 6 Finally, the court stated that the rule it was adopting is in
accordance with the work product rule in federal court, as well as the major-
ity of state courts. ' 8 7
The scope of attorney work product also received attention during the
Survey period. In Owens v. Wallace,18 8 the court concluded that an interro-
gatory asking a party to specify the facts he intends to rely upon is not sus-
ceptible to a work product objection.' 89 A request for production of a
party's trial exhibits, however, was found to be impermissible as invading the
work product privilege in Texas Tech Univ. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Schild. 190
Moreover, the court in Schild held that no evidence or in camera inspection
was required to preserve the objection, since the request on its face sought
privileged work product. 19'
Rule 503(a)(2) of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence' 92 defines a represen-
tative of the client, for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, as "one hav-
ing authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice
rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client."'' 93 The San Antonio
court of appeals strictly applied this definition in the context of a corporate
client, holding that a valid claim of privilege is not established merely by
proof that the persons who were privy to the attorney communications were
182. 818 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1991).
183. Id. at 750-52.
184. Id. at 750.
185. Id. at 751.
186. Id.
187. Id. & n.4-5. The court disapproved of one Texas case that had reached a contrary
result, DeWitt & Rearick, Inc. v. Ferguson, 699 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, orig.
proceeding), and limited the scope of its own prior decision in Allen v. Humphries, 559 S.W.2d
798 (Tex. 1977), to assertions of the investigative and consulting expert privileges.
188. 821 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, orig. proceeding).
189. Id. at 748. In what may be the first judicial determination of the issue, the court in
Owens also held that, where a set of interrogatories requires more than thirty answers in viola-
tion of TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(5), it is incumbent on the responding party to answer the first
thirty questions rather than refusing to respond at all. 821 S.W.2d at 749.
190. 828 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, orig. proceeding).
191. Id.




employees of the corporation. 19 4 The court noted that, while there are no
Texas cases on the issue, several commentators have written that Rule
503(a)(2) represents an adoption of the "control group" test for determining
whether an employee is a representative of the corporation for purposes of
privilege, which the United States Supreme Court rejected in Upjohn Co. v.
United States.195
Several cases decided during the Survey period addressed the question of
the so-called "offensive" use of a privilege.' 96 The court in KP. v. Packer'97
held that Rule 5 10(d)(5), 198 which provides an exception to the privilege for
mental health records where the record is relevant to a proceeding where the
party's mental or emotional condition is at issue, 199 was not applicable to the
mental health records of a mother who brought an action as next friend on
behalf of her child. 2°° In S.A.B., D.O. v. Schattman,20 the court construed
this same exception as abrogating the privilege whenever a party's mental or
emotional condition has been put in issue, either by that party or the oppos-
ing party. 20 2 The court noted that its conclusion in this regard was contrary
to two decisions from another court of appeals. 20 3 Finally, even in the ab-
sence of any specific exception or waiver in Rule 503,204 the court in West-
heimer v. Tennant20 5 held that a plaintiff should not be entitled to invoke the
attorney-client privilege offensively to shield relevant facts from
discovery. 206
Nicholson v. Wittig20 7 involved the rarely litigated privilege for communi-
cations with a member of the clergy. One of the plaintiffs in that case, a
wrongful death action, had spoken with a chaplain employed by the hospital
defendant. The defendants argued that the chaplain should be permitted to
testify to matters discussed with the plaintiff that related to her husband's
medical treatment, rather than spiritual matters, notwithstanding that
the plaintiff had properly invoked the privilege. The court disagreed, hold-
ing that the chaplain was acting in his capacity as a spiritual advisor
194. Cigna Corp. v. Spears, 838 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, orig.
proceeding).
195. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Cigna, 564-65, n.1 (citing authority).
196. See generally Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Tex. 1985)
(holding that plaintiff could not seek affirmative relief and at the same time withhold relevant
information based on claim of psychotherapist-patient privilege).
197. 826 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding).
198. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 510(d)(5).
199. Id.
200. Packer, 826 S.W.2d at 667.
201. 838 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
202. Id. at 293.
203. Id. at 292-93 (citing Scheffey v. Chambers, 790 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding) and Dossey v. Salazar, 808 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding [leave denied])).
204. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 503.
205. 831 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
206. Id. at 883-84 (disagreeing with Cantrell v. Johnson, 785 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1990, orig. proceeding)).




within the meaning of Rule 505(b), 208 regardless of the nature of the
communication. 20 9
C. SANCTIONS
A number of cases decided during the Survey period addressed the effect
of the Texas Supreme Court's 1991 decisions in TransAmerican Natural Gas
Corp. v. Powell210 and Braden v. Downey211 on a trial judge's ability to im-
pose sanctions for discovery abuse. In Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon,212 the
high court clarified that, while a trial judge's detailed findings of fact may
assist a reviewing court in some instances, they are not a prerequisite to the
imposition of the "death penalty" sanctions of dismissal or default.213 In
addition, the court noted that the proper standard of review on appeal from
a sanctions order is abuse of discretion, rather than the legal and factual
insufficiency standard applicable to appeals from nonjury trials. 2 14
Kutch v. Del Mar College215 held, apparently for the first time in this state,
that the Texas courts "have the inherent power to sanction for abuse of the
judicial process which may not be covered by rule or statute. ' 216 This inher-
ent power may be invoked where the conduct in question significantly inter-
feres with the court's exercise of its powers; due to its amorphous nature,
however, it should be sparingly used.217 Moreover, the due process limita-
tions described in TransAmerican are applicable to sanctions imposed under
the court's inherent power as well. 2 18 In FDIC v. Finlay,2 19 however, the
court held that a trial judge may not dismiss a suit with prejudice as a sanc-
tion for the plaintiff's violation of an oral order made at a pretrial
conference. 220
Rule 162221 provides that a plaintiff's dismissal or nonsuit of his claims
does not affect any pending motion for sanctions.222 In Felderhoff v.
Knauf,223 the supreme court considered the related issue of what impact a
208. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 505(b).
209. Nicholson, 832 S.W.2d at 687.
210. 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991).
211. 811 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1991).
212. 841 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1992).
213. Id. at 853. In Braden, however, the supreme court held that if the imposition of a
monetary sanction is so severe that it may preclude a party's continuation of the suit, the trial
judge must either provide that the sanction is payable only upon the entry of final judgment or
make an express finding why the sanction will not have such a preclusive effect. 811 S.W.2d at
929.
214. 841 S.W.2d at 853.
215. 831 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
216. Id. at 510.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 511. See also Lanfear v. Blackmon, 827 S.W.2d 87, 90-91 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) (applying TransAmerican guidelines in vacating
trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim as sanction for alleged perjury).
219. 832 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
220. Id. at 158.
221. TEX. R. Civ. P. 162.
222. Id.
223. 819 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. 1991).
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nonsuit has on a plaintiff's ability to challenge previously imposed sanctions.
The court concluded that "[a] nonsuit does not act as a waiver, bar or adju-
dication precluding plaintiffs from complaining on appeal of monetary sanc-
tions granted before the nonsuit. ' '224 The court in Schein v. American
Restaurant Group, Inc.225 held that a sanction order barring plaintiff from
introducing certain evidence at trial would be enforced in a second suit that
was filed by the plaintiff on the same cause of action, where the plaintiff had
nonsuited the first case after the sanction was imposed.226 The court rea-
soned that to rule otherwise would allow any discovery sanction to be
avoided simply by filing a nonsuit.227
D. DUTY TO SUPPLEMENT DISCOVERY
Once again, cases addressing the duty to supplement were plentiful during
the Survey period. Unlike prior years, however, the supreme court retreated
slightly in the battle to enforce the mandatory sanction of exclusion of wit-
nesses whose identities are not timely disclosed in accordance with Rules
166b(6)228 and 215(5).229 First, the court issued a new opinion on rehearing
in Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co. Inc.230 Although the court adhered to its
original conclusion that the rebuttal witness at issue should not have been
permitted to testify because her identity was not disclosed in response to
interrogatories, 231 the tone of the opinion changed. In this connection, the
majority appeared concerned about the potential inconsistency between the
automatic exclusion of even critical witnesses under Rule 215(5)232 and the
TransAmerican233 standards for the imposition of sanctions for other types
of discovery abuse.234 The court went on to hint that the supplementation
rules may soon be amended to provide trial courts with a broader range of
possible sanctions that can be imposed.235 Moreover, the court made clear
that, in the meantime, a trial court is not powerless to prevent the
mandatory exclusion rule from causing injustice. 236 Specifically, the court
noted that a continuance of the trial setting, with the imposition of a mone-
tary sanction against the party whose failure to supplement necessitated the
continuance, may be appropriate under certain circumstances. 237 Soon after
224. Id. at Ill.
225. 828 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ requested).
226. Id. at 308-09.
227. Id. at 309.
228. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6).
229. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
230. 830 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1992).
231. Id. at 917.
232. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
233. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991).
234. Alvarado, 830 SW.2d at 915. Prior to the new opinion in Alvarado, several courts had
attempted to take TransAmerican into account in failure to supplement cases. E.g., Hogan v.
Credit Motors, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 392, 394-96 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied (per
curium)); Pilgrim's Pride Corp. v. Thompson, 818 S.W.2d 185, 189-90 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1991, orig. proceeding).
235. Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 915.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 915-16 & n.5.
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Alvarado, the supreme court held for the first time since the 1984 amend-
ments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that an undisclosed witness
would be allowed to testify in Smith v. Southwest Feed Yards.238 In Smith,
the court held that an individual party, whose identity is certain and whose
personal knowledge has been communicated to all other parties more than
thirty days before trial, could testify despite having failed to identify himself
in response to a proper interrogatory. 23 9 Justices Gonzales and Hecht con-
curred in the decision, the former because he apparently believed that the
good cause exception to the exclusion sanction should not be so rigidly con-
strued,24° and the latter because he believed that the application of the rule
to preclude an individual party from testifying would violate the TransAmer-
ican standards. 241 Justice Comyn dissented strongly, chastising the majority
for ignoring the clear language of the court's prior decisions on the sub-
ject.242 Nevertheless, the supreme court has twice reaffirmed its conclusion
that undisclosed party witnesses should be permitted to testify on'their own
behalf since its decision in Smith. 243
The lower courts have already begun exploring the parameters of the ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule the supreme court has announced. In par-
ticular, two courts have addressed, with differing results, the question of
whether a party should be permitted to call an individual adverse party as a
witness without having previously identified the adverse party in answers to
interrogatories. In Brekalo v. Ballard,244 the appellate court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the plaintiff from calling
the defendant as a witness at trial.24 5 In Weng Enterprises, Inc. v. Embassy
World Travel, Inc. ,246 on the other hand, the court stated that the trial court
abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of one of the defendants,
who the plaintiff sought to call as a witness.247 The court held that the
plaintiff did not properly preserve the error, however, because it failed make
an offer of proof.24 8
Rule 166b(6)(b)249 requires a party to supplement its interrogatory an-
swers to identify expert witnesses "as soon as is practical," but no later than
thirty days before trial. 250 Courts continue to struggle with the question of
when a party may be required to designate its experts under the first prong
238. 835 S.W.2d 89, 95-96 (Tex. 1992).
239. Id. at 91-92.
240. Id. at 92-93 (Gonzales, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 95 (Hecht, J., concurring).
242. 835 S.W.2d at 95-96, 99 (Comyn, J., dissenting).
243. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1992); Rogers v. Stell, 835
S.W.2d 100, 101 (Tex. 1992).
244. 836 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ).
245. Id. at 785. See also Guerrero v. Sanders (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992), rev'd in part,
1993 WL 22016 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 2, 1993, n.w.h.) (holding that even if refusing to
allow defendant to call plaintiff adversely was an abuse of discretion, it was not harmful error).
246. 837 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
247. Id. at 221.
248. Id.




of this test, and what the consequences are of failing to do so. In Tinsley v.
Downey,251 the court joined those courts that have held that the "as soon as
is practical" language does not require a party to designate experts as soon
as they are contacted or risk their exclusion at trial.252 The court reasoned
that a party may wish to consult an expert for investigative purposes first,
without making a decision on whether she will testify until she has reviewed
all of the relevant material gathered in discovery. 253 In Loffland Brothers
Co. v. Downey,254 the trial court had ordered the parties to designate their
expert witnesses more than eight months prior to the scheduled trial date
pursuant to Rule 166b(2)(e)(3). 255 The appellate court held that it was an
abuse of his discretion to deny the defendants' motion for leave to designate
experts, which was filed a month after this deadline, since there was no justi-
fiable reason for strict enforcement of the early designation requirement. 256
In Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Lacy,257 the supreme court held that a
party in a multi-party suit has the right to rely on another party's answers to
interrogatories even though she was not the party that propounded such in-
terrogatories. 258 Thus, if the interrogatory answers fail to disclose an expert
or fact witness, any other party may object to the testimony of such wit-
ness.259 During the Survey period, the courts of appeals differed on whether
a party should likewise be entitled to rely on another party's identification of
witnesses in offering their testimony even though she did not supplement her
own interrogatory answers to disclose them. In Bullock v. Aluminum Co. of
America,260 the court concluded that Ticor Title stands only for the proposi-
tion that a party can rely on another party's interrogatory answers defen-
sively, i.e., to prevent a witness from testifying.261 Thus, the court refused to
allow the defendant to call witnesses it failed to identify even though the
plaintiffs did.262 In West Texas Gathering Co. v. Exxon Corp.,263 on the
other hand, the court interpreted Ticor Title broadly to allow the plaintiff to
251. 822 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding [leave
denied]).
252. Id. at 786-87.
253. Id. at 787.
254. 822 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding).
255. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e)(3) (allowing judge to compel determination and disclosure
of whether expert will testify within a reasonable and specific time before trial). Loffland, 822
S.W.2d at 250. In Pedraza v. Peters, 826 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992,
no writ), the court held that the trial court lacked authority to compel an early designation of
experts, apparently because there was no trial setting at the time the order was entered. Id. at
745.
256. Loffiand, 822 S.W.2d at 252.
257. 803 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1991).
258. Id. at 266.
259. Id.
260. 843 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, n.w.h.).
261. Id. at 640.
262. Id. See also Baylor Medical Plaza Servs. Corp. v. Kidd, 834 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (refusing to allow party to call expert witness designated
as a fact witness by another party); Thompson v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 824 S.W.2d
212, 217 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ requested) (party must designate an expert witness
despite opposing party's designation of same expert).
263. 837 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ granted).
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call two witnesses it failed to identify in its interrogatory answers based upon
the defendant's designation of them. 264
Housing Auth. v. Rodriguez- Yepez 265 involved the issue of what informa-
tion a party must provide regarding the fact witnesses it may call at trial.
The plaintiff requested in an interrogatory to one of the defendants not only
the identity of persons with knowledge of relevant facts, but also a specific
statement of the facts known to each such person. The defendant objected
that she was not required to state the knowledge possessed by the persons
identified in her response. The court of appeals agreed with the defendant,
holding that under Rule 166b(2)(d) 266 the burden is on the requesting party
to depose any individuals who are identified in interrogatory answers to de-
termine what knowledge they possess. 267 The court opined that requiring a
party to detail all of the knowledge of each potential witness, at the risk of
having any testimony that is not specified excluded under Rule 215(5),268
would create "an impossible burden. ' 269 In denying the plaintiff's applica-
tion for writ of error, however, the Texas Supreme Court stated that it
"should not be construed as approving the implication that deposition is the
sole vehicle for obtaining information concerning the knowledge and opin-
ions of witnesses with knowledge or relevant facts."'270
The Texas courts also addressed several procedural issues raised by the
duty to supplement during the Survey period. Foster v. Cunningham271
stands for the proposition that a request for the identity of potential wit-
nesses in a deposition will, like a request in interrogatories, trigger a duty to
supplement on the responding party. 272 In Shell Western E&P, Inc. v. Par-
tida,273 the court held that service of supplemental interrogatory answers
were timely when they were placed in the mail thirty days prior to trial,
notwithstanding that they were received only twenty-eight days before
264. Id. at 776.
265. 828 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied), writ denied per curiam, 843
S.W.2d 475 (Tex. 1992).
266. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(d).
267. Housing Auth., 828 S.W.2d at 501.
268. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
269. Housing Auth., 828 S.W.2d at 501.
270. Housing Auth., 843 S.W.2d at 476. The supreme court also noted that the broad scope
of permissible discovery can be tempered by the trial court's discretion, on a case by case basis,
to issue protective orders. Id.
271. 825 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
272. Id. at 808. Foster should also serve as a reminder that when a party first learns of
information that should be disclosed within thirty days of trial, and may therefore be able to
successfully demonstrate good cause why it should not be excluded, supplementation should
still be made as soon as possible even though the thirty-day deadline was missed. Id. at 808-09
(holding that there was no good cause to allow testimony of witness for whom incorrect ad-
dress had been given where responding party located witness five days prior to trial but did not
provide information to requesting party).
273. 823 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, orig. proceeding).
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trial. 274 Finally, the court in Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hospital27 held
that supplemental answers to interrogatories are not required to be verified,
and, therefore, witnesses identified in an unverified supplemental response
would not be prohibited from testifying. 276
E. MISCELLANEOUS
Probably the most significant decision in the discovery arena during the
Survey period was Walker v. Packer,277 in which the Texas Supreme Court
reaffirmed the strict standard for obtaining mandamus relief.278 Specifically,
the court held that mandamus will issue to correct a discovery order only if
the petitioner demonstrates that there is no adequate remedy by appeal.
279
The court disapproved of its prior opinions in Barker v. Dunham280 and
Allen v. Humphries2 81 to the extent they could be construed as abolishing or
relaxing this requirement in the discovery context.28 2 Further, the court
held that "an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely because it may in-
volve more expense or delay" than a mandamus, once again disapproving its
own former precedents to the extent they implied a more lenient standard. 28 3
In response to a lengthy dissent by Justice Doggett, the majority in
Walker went on to explain why the resurrection of the traditional limitations
on mandamus relief would not effectively deprive litigants of meaningful re-
view of discovery orders, offering several examples of circumstances under
which a writ would still issue. First, appeal would not be an adequate rem-
edy where the error will be incurable, such as when a trial court orders the
production of privileged information. 28 4 Second, a discovery error that ef-
fectively precludes a party from presenting a viable claim or defense at trial,
so that the requirement of a trial would be a wasteful formality, would be
subject to immediate mandamus review. 28 5 Finally, the court opined that
ordinary appeal may be inadequate if the trial court prohibits discovery and
274. Id. at 402-03. Interestingly, the court also appeared to construe the requirement that
a copy of the interrogatory answers "be filed promptly in the clerk's office," TEX. R. Civ. P.
168, to mean that filing of the supplemental answers must also be accomplished at least thirty
days before trial. Id.
275. 831 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ granted).
276. Id. at 48. The Fort Worth court's conclusion in this regard is consistent with that of
the other courts that have addressed the issue. Id. (citing cases). But see Thompson v. Kawa-
saki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 824 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ requested)
(identification of experts must be done in proper response to interrogatories and not simply by
letter).
277. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992).
278. Id. at 842.
279. Id.
280. 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977).
281. 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1977).
282. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842.
283. Id. (citing cases).
284. Id. at 843. The court's opinion, and this example in particular, drew a rebuke from
Justice Doggett that the majority was applying a "double standard" by announcing that the
"remedy [of mandamus] will be available to support concealment of the truth but not its dis-
closure." Id. at 846 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 843.
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the missing discovery cannot be included in the record. 28 6 The court noted,
however, that this situation should rarely arise if the procedures of Rule
166b(4) 28 7 are followed. 288
In Remington Arms Co. v. Canales,28 9 the supreme court held that a de-
fendant who had failed to timely object to a request for production due to
miscommunication in its counsel's office had demonstrated good cause to
allow it to lodge its objections out of time.290 The court found that, while
inadvertence of counsel in failing to object was not good cause in and of
itself, in the case before it the defendant had responded to an identical re-
quest for production from the same plaintiffs' counsel in another suit of the
same type. 29 1 The case is significant because the supreme court clearly indi-
cated that the good cause standard for allowing late objections is the same
strict good cause standard for determining whether to allow an undisclosed
witness to testify at trial. 292 The cautious practitioner should question,
therefore, whether this ruling affects in any way those cases that apply a
more lenient standard for good cause in determining whether to allow the
withdrawal of deemed admissions pursuant to Rule 169(2).293
Production of a party's tax returns was at issue in Chamberlain v.
Cherry294 and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ramirez.295 In Chamberlain, the
court held that the supreme court's decision in Lunsford v. Morris,296 which
allows plaintiffs to take discovery on defendants' net worth in cases where
punitive damages are sought, 297 did not require production of the defend-
ant's tax returns since such returns do not reveal net worth information. 298
In a similar vein, the supreme court held in Sears, Roebuck that, where the
defendant produced its annual reports, and plaintiff did not challenge the
accuracy of the net worth figures reflected in such reports, the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to produce its federal income
tax returns as well. 299
Finally, the decision in Keene Corp. v. Caldwell3° ° addressed the interplay
between state court discovery requests and federal court protective orders.
There, the appellate court held that the trial judge abused his discretion in
286. Id. at 843-44.
287. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(4) (governing procedure for presenting objections to discovery
and providing for in camera review of allegedly privileged or exempt information).
288. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 844.
289. 837 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. 1992).
290. Id. at 626.
291. Id. at 625-26.
292. Id. (citing cases).
293. TEX. R. CIV P. 169(2). See, e.g., North River Ins. Co. of New Jersey v. Greene, 824
S.W.2d 697, 700-01 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied) (inadvertence of counsel or cleri-
cal error can negate conscious indifference and thereby support motion for leave to withdraw
deemed admissions).
294. 818 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, orig. proceeding).
295. 824 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1992).
296. 746 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1988).
297. Id. at 473.
298. Chamberlain, 818 S.W.2d at 205-07.
299. Sears, Roebuck, 824 S.W.2d at 559.
300. 840 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] orig. proceeding).
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ordering documents to be produced in violation of a protective order previ-
ously entered by a federal court in another case. 301 The court reasoned that
the parties' reliance interest in the protective order and principles of comity
were both entitled to great weight in its analysis and would require that the
discovery be denied. 30 2 Moreover, the court also held that the protective
order was entitled to full faith and credit protection.30 3
X. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A series of procedural snafus provided the court in Nickerson v. ELL.
Instruments, Inc. 30 4 with an opportunity to address the notice requirements
of Rule 166a.30 5 On June 11 the defendant served a motion for summary
judgment, which was set for hearing exactly twenty-one days later on July 2.
Two weeks later the hearing was reset for July 9. Seven days before the new
hearing date, the plaintiff filed his response to the summary judgment mo-
tion. The following day, however, the court granted defendant's motion
without any hearing. In response to a subsequent motion for new trial in
which plaintiff complained that he had not received twenty-one days notice
of the original hearing as required by Rule 166a(c), 30 6 the trial court ordered
a new trial. Immediately thereafter on the same date, however, the trial
court again granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
In reversing the trial court's judgment, the court of appeals agreed with
plaintiff's first contention that he had not received the required twenty-one
days notice of the initial hearing.30 7 The court observed that both the date
notice is given and the date of the hearing are excluded in computing the
notice period required under Rule 166a(c). 308 Although the court noted that
the original hearing was reset to a later date, it expressed no opinion as to
whether this resetting cured the initial defect with respect to notice.3°9 In-
stead, it found that the trial court committed additional error by granting
defendant's motion before the second date set for the hearing, which de-
prived plaintiff of the opportunity to file any additional response to the mo-
tion before the hearing. 310 Although the trial court would have had
discretion in deciding whether to grant plaintiff's petition for leave to file an
additional response, the court of appeals nonetheless held that a party's right
to petition the court for such leave is guaranteed under Rule 166a(c). 311
Finally, the court concluded that the order granting a new trial, followed
by an immediate reconsideration of the summary judgment motion on the
301. Id. at 720.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 817 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
305. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a.
306. Id. 166a(c).
307. 817 S.W.2d at 835-36.
308. Id., citing Williams v. City of Angleton, 724 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).





same day, did not solve the notice problem. 312 Once the trial court granted
the motion for new trial, it was required to give plaintiff reasonable notice of
any subsequent summary judgment hearing. 313 Under the facts of the case,
the Nickerson court held that at least seven days notice of the hearing should
have been given.3 14
Despite these strict notice requirements of rule 166a, Negrini v. Beale315
warns that defects in the notice provided under the rule may be waived.
Although the appellant in Negrini apparently did not receive notice of the
summary judgment hearing until less than twenty-one days before the date
of the hearing, the court held that the appellant waived any challenge to the
defective notice by appearing at the hearing without filing a controverting
affidavit or requesting a continuance.316 While the court observed that a
complete failure to provide any notice of the hearing would present a juris-
dictional issue that could be raised for the first time on appeal, a party's
allegation that he received less notice than required by statute does not pres-
ent an issue of jurisdiction and, therefore, must first be raised in the trial
court.
3 17
Two other cases decided during the Survey period also involved issues of
summary judgment procedure. University of Texas System v. Ainsa,
Skipworth, Zavaleta and Butterworth 318 held that a trial court may not grant
a summary judgment in favor of a party who has not filed a motion for
summary judgment. 319 Prowse v. Schellhase320 joins the growing list of
courts32' which have held that the Deerfield322 authentication rules for un-
filed discovery materials survived the adoption of a new section to Rule
166a 323 regarding summary judgment use of discovery materials not other-
wise on file.
Finally, in Elder Constr., Inc. v. City of Colleyville,324 the supreme court
held that a trial court may not reverse an interlocutory summary judgment
in favor of one party without providing that party an opportunity to try fully
the issues thereby reinjected into the case. 325 Thus, the trial court erred
when it waited until after the close of evidence to reverse its previously
granted partial summary judgment, and then submitted questions to the jury
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Nickerson, 817 S.W.2d at 836.
315. 822 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
316. Id. at 823.
317. Id., citing Davis v. Davis, 734 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987,
writ refd n.r.e.).
318. 823 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, n.w.h.).
319. Id. at 693-94. See Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. 1984).
320. 838 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, n.w.h.).
321. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. King, 810 S.W.2d 772, 773-74 (Tex. App.-Amarillo), writ
denied per curiam, 816 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1991), discussed in Figari, 1992 AnnualSurvey, supra
note 23, at 1400-01.
322. See Deerfield Land Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty Co., 758 S.W.2d 608, 610
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
323. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(d) (adopted in 1990).
324. 839 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. 1992).
325. Id. at 91.
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about issues that had earlier been foreclosed by the summary judgment.326
XI. JURY QUESTIONS
Rule 277327 requires cases to be submitted to the jury on broad-form ques-
tions whenever feasible. 328 The Texas Supreme Court provided guidance to
trial courts in carrying out this mandate in two cases decided during the
Survey period. In Keetch v. Kroger Co. ,329 the high court stated that a prem-
ises liability case can properly be submitted to the jury on a general negli-
gence question if it is accompanied by appropriate instructions. 330 In State
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne,33' the court held that the de-
fendant's requested jury question, inquiring about an issue on which the trial
court failed to adequately instruct the jury in connection with its broad-form
submission, was sufficient to preserve error even in the absence of a proper
objection to the charge. 332
The requirement that a party submit proposed jury questions and instruc-
tions in substantially correct form in order to preserve error in the court's
charge333 was also the subject of two decisions of note during the Survey
period. The court in Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Lee334 held that a defendant's
requested broad-form question on plaintiff's negligence was not in substan-
tially correct form because it was not accompanied by a limiting instruc-
tion.335 The court in Otis Elevator Co. v. Shows336 applied this rule even
more stringently, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to sub-
mit the defendant's requested instruction on unavoidable accident because it
included a second sentence not found in the Texas Pattern Jury Charges.337
Significantly, the court apparently agreed that the defendant was entitled to
an instruction to the jury of the type included as the second sentence of its
proposed submission; because it was joined with the unavoidable accident
instruction, however, the court concluded it would have been an improper
326. Id.
327. TEx. R. CIv. P. 277.
328. Id. Interestingly, several cases decided during the Survey period noted the disadvan-
tage of submitting a case on broad-form questions, i.e., the inability to determine the basis for
the jury's negative answer. E.g., Dealers Elec. Supply v. Pierce, 824 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1992, writ denied).
329. 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992).
330. Id. at 266.
331. 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
332. Id. at 239. Significantly, the court decried the byzantine rules that have evolved for
preserving error in the charge and stated that recommendations for their simplification are
currently under consideration. Id. at 239-40. In the meantime, however, the current rules
should be applied to serve when possible what the court noted should be the single test:
"whether the party made the trial court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and ob-
tained a ruling." Id. at 240.
333. TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
334. 821 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, writ granted).
335. Id. at 407-08.
336. 822 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).




comment on the evidence. 338 Thus, the defendant apparently would have
preserved the error if it had tendered the two requested instructions sepa-
rately to the trial judge.
XII. JURY PRACTICE
As reported in Figari, 1992 Annual Survey, the United States Supreme
Court recently held that a party to a civil suit may not use its peremptory
challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely on account of their race.3 39
Several decisions during the Survey period discussed the proper procedure
for making a "Batson" 34° challenge to a party's use of peremptory strikes.
For example, in Lott v. City of Fort Worth,341 the court, relying on criminal
precedents, stated that a Batson hearing is an evidentiary hearing in which
the trial judge serves as factfinder. 342 The complaining party must establish
a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the opposing party
" 'struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire,
or has used a disproportionate number of peremptories against the
group.' -343 The burden then shifts to the challenged party to rebut the pre-
sumption of discrimination by offering a racially neutral explanation for
each of the questioned peremptory strikes.3" If the trial judge determines
that even one member of the complaining party's race was struck for dis-
criminatory reasons, the entire jury selection process is invalidated. 345
In order to complain on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to strike
a prospective juror for cause, a party must advise the trial court, prior to
exercising her peremptory challenges, that she will exhaust her peremptory
challenges and that specific objectionable jurors will remain on the panel. 346
In Beavers v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 347 the court held that
appellants failed to comply with this rule when they raised their objection
immediately after delivering their list of peremptory strikes to the trial judge,
338. 822 S.W.2d at 61.
339. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991).
340. The Supreme Court first announced the rule prohibiting the prosecution in a criminal
case from utilizing its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory mariner in Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
341. 840 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, n.w.h.).
342. Id. at 149. The trial judge's findings of fact will be subject to a "clearly erroneous"
standard of review on appeal. Id. at 150.
343. Id. at 150 (quoting Dewberry v. State, 776 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).
344. Lot, 840 S.W.2d at 150. The opinion provides examples of some of the factors that a
court should look at in determining the legitimacy of a party's allegedly race-neutral explana-
tion, including (1) whether the reason given is related to the facts of the case, (2) whether there
was a lack of meaningful questioning of the prospective juror, (3) whether persons with similar
characteristics were also struck, and (4) whether an explanation based on a group trait is
shown to apply specifically to the stricken juror. Id. at 151. Obviously, in order to preserve
any error in the trial court's overruling of a Batson challenge, the complaining party must
ensure that the voir dire is recorded. Soto v. Texas Industries, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
345. Lott, 840 S.W.2d at 153.
346. Hallett v. Houston Northwest Medical Ctr., 689 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. 1985).
347. 821 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied).
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but before the jury was seated.348 The court stated that peremptory chal-
lenges are exercised by the parties' actions and not by the trial court's con-
duct in seating the jury. 349
The court in Fazzino v. Guido350 concluded that the trial judge did not
commit fundamental error by allowing jurors to propound questions to wit-
nesses at trial.35' The court noted that the issue was apparently one of first
impression in the civil courts in Texas, although two recent appellate court
decisions in criminal cases had permitted juror questioning of witnesses. 352
In reaching its decision, the Fazzino court emphasized that the procedure
utilized by the trial judge, namely, taking written questions from jurors and
receiving objections to same outside the jury's presence, protected the parties
from harm.353
XIII. JUDGMENT, DISMISSAL, AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
More than fifty years ago, the Texas Supreme Court announced the test
for granting a motion for new trial after a default judgment in Craddock v.
Sunshine Bus Lines.3 54 In Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 355 the court
clarified that the Craddock test consists of only three elements, the first of
which is that the failure to file an answer was not intentional, but was due to
a mistake or accident. 356 Put another way, a mistake or accident can negate
an intention not to file an answer.357 The court also held that a mistake of
law may be sufficient to satisfy the first element of the Craddock test.
35 8
Thus, the court concluded that the garnishment defendant in Moody was
entitled to a new trial where it failed to file an answer because of a mistaken
belief that freezing the garnished accounts and tendering the funds on de-
posit to the trial court was a sufficient response to the writ of
garnishment. 359
The supreme court also set aside default judgments in Smith v. Lipp-
mann36° and Clements v. Barnes.36' In the former case, the court held that a
pro se defendant who files, within the time for answering, a signed letter
348. Id. at 680-81.
349. Id. at 681.
350. 836 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
351. Id. at 276. The court apparently addressed the issue under a fundamental error stan-
dard since neither party objected to the procedure of allowing juror questions at trial. Id.
352. Id. at 275-76 (citing Allen v. State, 807 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th
Dist.] 1991), rev'd, 1993 WL 13192 (Tex. App. Jan. 27, 1993) and Buchanan v. State, 807
S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991), vacated, 1993 WL 37428 (Tex. App.
Feb. 17, 1993)). Subsequent to the decision in Fazzino, however, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals outlawed the practice of juror questioning in criminal cases in Morrison v. State, No.
0970-91, 1992 WL 367513 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 1992).
353. Fazzino, 836 S.W.2d at 275-76.
354. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939).
355. 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992).
356. Id. at 82-83.
357. Id. at 83.
358. Id. at 84.
359. Id. at 85.
360. 826 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1992).
361. 834 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. 1992).
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identifying the parties, the case, and his current address has sufficiently an-
swered and is entitled to notice of any further proceedings. 362 In the latter,
the court reversed the court of appeals' denial of a court-appointed bank-
ruptcy trustee's writ of error from a default judgment because the plaintiff
failed to allege that the trustee acted outside the scope of her authority, as
would have been necessary to avoid her judicial immunity.363
Procedural aspects of motions for new trial were at issue in two notewor-
thy decisions during the Survey period. The supreme court held in Mueller
v. Saravia364 that, where a judgment contains an order severing the adjudi-
cated claims and assigning them a new cause number, a motion for new trial
filed under the original cause number is sufficient to extend the time for
appeal. 365
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court proclaimed in Stewart Title Guaranty
Co. v. Sterling366 that, contrary to what many had believed, the "one satis-
faction rule" of Bradshaw v. Baylor University367 is not dead.368 The one
satisfaction rule, which prohibits a party from recovering more than the to-
tal amount of his damages where he has settled with at least one joint
tortfeasor by requiring a dollar for dollar credit against any judgment that he
subsequently obtains for the same injury, 369 was called into doubt by
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 370 As the court stated in Stewart Title, how-
ever, Duncan did not authorize double recovery; instead, it simply avoided
the problem through judgment reductions based on the comparative fault of
the settling defendant rather than the Bradshaw dollar for dollar credit.371
Thus, in those areas in which the law does not provide for the allocation of
fault or causation, such as intentional torts, the one satisfaction rule is still
applicable.372
XIV. RES JUDICATA
The Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the transactional approach to res
judicata in Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp. ,373 thereby eliminating some of the
confusion previously associated with the doctrine. In several earlier deci-
sions,374 the court had recognized that res judicata, or claim pre-
362. Smith, 826 S.W.2d at 138.
363. Clements, 834 S.W.2d at 46-47.
364. 826 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. 1992).
365. Id. at 609.
366. 822 S.W.2d I (Tex. 1991).
367. 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (1935).
368. Stewart Title, 822 S.W.2d at 6.
369. Id. at 2-3.
370. 665 S.W.2d 414, 430-32 (Tex. 1984) (rejecting the reasoning behind the one satisfac-
tion rule in the context of the comparative causation scheme adopted by the court for products
liability suits).
371. Stewart Title, 822 S.W.2d at 3.
372. Id.
373. 837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992).
374. See Jeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1985); Gracia v. RC Cola - 7 Up
Bottling Co., 667 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. 1984); Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d
816, 818 (Tex. 1984).
1088 [Vol. 46
CIVIL PROCEDURE
clusion, 375 prevented the splitting of a cause of action by proscribing relitiga-
tion of claims that had been finally adjudicated as well as related matters
that should have been litigated in the prior suit. Because this definition of
the rule would literally require joinder of all disputes between the parties,
regardless of whether they had anything in common, the court acknowl-
edged in Barr that it had resorted to a wide variety of theories and tests over
the years in order to give res judicata a more restrictive application. 376 For
example, in Griffin v. Holiday Inns ofAmerica,377 the court rejected the view
that a judgment as to one claim was res judicata of all claims arising out of
the same transaction. Instead, the court stated that a judgment on one cause
of action was "not conclusive of a subsequent suit on a different cause of
action except as to those issues of fact actually litigated and determined in
the first suit."'378 In Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Kownslar,379 on the other
hand, the court made no attempt to determine whether there was more than
one cause of action involved, choosing instead to decide the case solely on
policy grounds.380 Later, in both Texas Water Rights Comm. v. Crow Iron
Works381 and Gracia v. RC Cola - 7-Up Bottling Co.,382 the court adopted a
transactional test, shifting the focus from the cause of action to the subject
matter of the litigation. 383 Although this latter formulation of the doctrine
was inconsistent with the test announced earlier in Griffin, the court did not
expressly overrule the Griffin test in either Crow Iron Works or Gracia.
Unable to reconcile these varying approaches, the court in Barr re-em-
braced the transactional test announced in Crow Iron Works and Gracia and
expressly overruled its earlier decision in Griffin.384 In doing so, the court
observed that the transactional test was consistent with the approach taken
by the Restatement of Judgments, 385 and substantially similar to the com-
pulsory counterclaim rule38 6 embodied in the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
375. Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents relitigation only of particular issues
already resolved in a prior suit. 837 S.W.2d at 647.
376. Id. at 648; see generally 5 William Dorsaneo, Texas Lit. Guide, § 131.06[4][b][ii]
(1991).
377. 496 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1973).
378. Id. at 538.
379. 496 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1973).
380. Id. at 532. The court acknowledged in Barr that this pure policy approach lacked
objective standards and afforded little basis for consistency and formulation of precedent. 837
S.W.2d at 649 (quoting Z. Steakley & W. Howell, Ruminations on Res Judicata, 28 Sw. L. J.
355, 362-63 (1974)).
381. 582 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1979).
382. 667 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1984).
383. According to the court in Crow Iron Works: "The scope of res judicata is not limited
to matters actually litigated; the judgment in the first suit precludes a second action. . .on
causes of action or defenses which arise out of the same subject matter and which might have
been litigated in the first suit." 582 S.W.2d at 771-72; accord Gracia, 667 S.W.2d at 519.
384. 837 S.W.2d at 649.
385. Restatement of Judgments § 24(1) provides that a final judgment on an action extin-
guishes the right to bring suit on the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of
which the action arose.
386. TEX. R. Civ. P. 97(a) requires a party to state as a counterclaim any claim that arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.
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dure.387 Under this transactional approach, trial courts must analyze the
factual basis of a party's claims without regard to the form of the action in
order to determine what constitutes the subject matter of a suit.388 A subse-
quent suit will then be barred if it arises out of the same subject matter as a
previous suit and, through the exercise of diligence, could have been litigated
in the prior suit.389
In Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kaminsky,390 the court considered
whether a plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees incurred in defending a suit for
breach of a lease was barred by the plaintiff's failure to assert that claim as a
counterclaim in the earlier suit. In addressing the question, the court first
observed that parties are typically permitted to recover attorney's fees even
in suits in which their entitlement to such fees is contingent upon the out-
come of the suit.391 The court also noted that at least one other court392 had
specifically held that a tenant who successfully defended a suit for breach of
a lease could recover his attorney's fees in the initial suit.393 As a result, the
court concluded that the plaintiff could have recovered his fees by counter-
claim in the prior suit. 394
The court considered more difficult, however, the question of whether
plaintiff's counterclaim for fees was compulsory in the first suit. According
to plaintiff, his entitlement to fees was contingent on his success in defending
the prior suit. Therefore, the claim for fees was immature at the time of the
first suit and could not be a compulsory counterclaim in that suit. The court
acknowledged that a counterclaim is compulsory only if it is mature at the
time the defendant is required to file his answer. 395 Moreover, the court
termed "persuasive" the federal cases396 holding that a claim for attorney's
fees incurred defending a previous lawsuit was not a compulsory counter-
claim. 397 Nonetheless, the court held that plaintiff's claim was a compulsory
counterclaim in the first suit and, therefore, barred by res judicata due to his
failure to assert the claim in that suit. 398 The court decided that the claim
for fees was not premature in the first suit even though recovery of those fees
was contingent on the outcome of that suit. 399 Moreover, permitting a sepa-
rate suit in these circumstances, according to the court, would only en-
courage a multiplicity of suits and delays in litigation, thereby undermining
387. 837 S.W.2d at 649-50.
388. Id. at 649.
389. Id. at 650.
390. 820 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied).
391. Id. at 880.
392. Briargrove Shopping Ctr. v. Vilar, 647 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1982, no writ).
393. 820 S.W.2d at 880-81.
394. Id. at 881.
395. Id.; see Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. 1988) (setting forth
six elements of compulsory counterclaims, including maturity of the claim).
396. See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Security Industries, Inc., 391 F. Supp.
326, 327 (W.D. Wash. 1974); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 29 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1962).





the policy purposes of the compulsory counterclaim rule.4° °
Guy v. Damson Oil Corp.401 discusses the proper procedure for abating a
suit on the basis of a prior pending action in the court of appeals. The plain-
tiffs in Guy filed suit against various defendants asserting title to fractional
interests in certain oil and gas leases. Defendants responded with a plea in
abatement alleging that plaintiffs had earlier filed the same lawsuit against
them in Harris County, and that a take nothing judgment had been entered
in that suit in favor of the defendants. Although the judgment entered in the
Harris County suit was still on appeal, the trial court in Guy sustained the
defendants' plea in abatement and entered an order dismissing plaintiffs' suit
with prejudice. On appeal from the order of dismissal, plaintiffs argued that
their second suit was not subject to abatement since the earlier suit was no
longer pending in the Harris County trial court and defendants could not use
a plea in abatement as the vehicle for advancing a defense of res judicata.
Prior to the decision in Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick,4° 2 a judgment in
Texas was not final for res judicata purposes while an appeal was still pend-
ing. Cases decided before Scurlock, therefore, had held that the pendency of
an appeal from a trial court's judgment was also sufficient grounds for abate-
ment and dismissal of a subsequent suit.403 Because the Scurlock decision
brought a judgment on appeal within the scope of res judicata,404 it was
unclear after Scurlock whether the pendency of a prior action on appeal
should still be raised by plea in abatement as opposed to an affirmative de-
fense of res judicata. According to the court in Guy, either method is appro-
priate.405 The court acknowledged that the affirmative defense of res
judicata was now available under the circumstances of the case in light of the
recent decision in Scurlock.4° 6 It found nothing in the Scurlock opinion,
however, to suggest that the extension of res judicata to judgments on appeal
was intended to narrow the use of pleas in abatement.4° 7 On the contrary,
the court noted that federal courts4°8 and commentators4 9 alike had con-
cluded that abatement continued to be the preferable remedy while the out-
come of the first judgment remained uncertain on appeal. 410
Although it decided that a plea in abatement was proper, the court in Guy
held that the trial judge had no authority to dismiss the case with preju-
400. Id.
401. No. 13-91-028-CV, 1991 WL 181894 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Sept. 18, 1991,
n.w.h.).
402. 724 S.W.2d I (Tex. 1986), discussed in 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 36, at 561.
403. See, e.g., Prairie Producing Co. v. Martens, 705 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stein v. Lewisville I.S.D., 496 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1973, mand. overr.).
404. 724 S.W.2d at 6 (judgment is final for purposes of issue and claim preclusion despite
the taking of an appeal unless the appeal amounts to a trial de novo).
405. 1991 WL 181894 at * 3.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. See Crot v. Byrne, 646 F. Supp. 1245, 1257 (D.C. Ill. 1986).
409. See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4433
(Supp. 1991).
410. 1991 WL 181894 at * 3.
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dice.411 The court remarked that dismissal pursuant to a plea in abatement
upon the ground of prior pending action should be effective only so long as
the cause of abatement continues to exist.4 2 Thus, the order of dismissal
should have been without prejudice to bringing a new suit upon the same set
of facts if the cause of action still existed after the grounds for abatement
disappeared. 413
XV. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Appointment of Masters
Rule 171414 permits trial courts to appoint a master in chancery for good
cause in exceptional cases. In Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell,415
the trial court appointed a master to oversee all discovery in the underlying
litigation on the basis that the suit was a controversy of substantial complex-
ity in which the increased expenses associated with a master would be offset
by the master's efforts in reducing the complexities of trial.4 6 Eight months
later, but prior to the first proceeding before the master, one of the parties
objected to the master's appointment. When the trial court refused to rule
on this objection, the complaining party filed an original mandamus pro-
ceeding against the trial judge in the court of appeals. Respondent, the trial
court, responded by arguing that the challenge to the master was untimely
and that the underlying suit was exceptional, thus justifying the appointment
of a master.
The court of appeals rejected respondent's arguments on the basis of
Simpson v. Canales,417 which was recently decided by the Texas Supreme
Court. In Simpson, the court held that a case was not exceptional and there
was no good cause to refer all discovery matters to a master, even though the
suit was a complex toxic tort case involving eighteen defendants and volumi-
nous discovery that had already spawned eight hearings on discovery mo-
tions.418 In contrast, the suit in Caldwell involved only five defendants and
less than a dozen written discovery requests served by the parties. The court
of appeals concluded that if Simpson was not an exceptional case justifying a
blanket order of discovery, neither was Caldwell.419
The Caldwell court likewise rejected respondent's contention that peti-
tioner had waived its challenge to the master's appointment by waiting eight
months to object. 420 Unable to locate any Texas authority on point,42' and
411. Id. at * 4.
412. Id.; see Texas Automatic Sprinklers, Inc. v. Albert Sterling and Assoc., 606 S.W.2d
12, 14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers Ins.
Ass'n v. Baeza, 584 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).
413. 1991 WL 181894 at *4.
414. TEX. R. Ov. P. 171.
415. 830 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
416. Id. at 623.
417. 806 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1991).
418. Id. at 812.
419. 830 S.W.2d at 626-27.
420. Id. at 625.
421. Id. at 624.
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because Rule 171 does not itself specify a time by which the parties must
object to the appointment of a master,422 the court examined cases interpret-
ing the companion federal rule. 423 Although these cases require a party to
object to the appointment of a special master at the time of the appointment
or within a reasonable time thereafter, 424 the court observed that none of the
federal cases defined what constituted a reasonable time.425 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that there was no fixed arbitrary period in which the ob-
jection must be asserted; rather, a party may register his objection at any
time before he participates in proceedings before the master. 426 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the objection had not been waived since it was filed
prior to the first hearing before the master, even though the parties had cop-
ied the master with their written discovery over the eight months that
elapsed between the date of the master's appointment and the first scheduled
hearing before the master.427
2. Judicial Estoppel
Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party is estopped from asserting
any position contrary to a position he has alleged or admitted under oath in
a prior proceeding. 428 According to the court in Wells v. Kansas University
Endowment Association,429 however, judicial estoppel does not apply to con-
tradictory positions taken in the same proceeding. 430 Consequently, the
court in Wells held that a party was not judicially estopped in the proceeding
by virtue of statements contained in his affidavit and interrogatory answers
filed in the same proceeding. 43'
3. Sanctions
In Lassiter v. Shavor,432 the appellant's trial pleadings were stricken as a
sanction for his violation of the trial court's order in limine. Although no
procedural rule specifically authorizes a trial court to strike a party's plead-
ings for violation of a pretrial order unrelated to discovery, 433 the court held
on the basis of Koslow's v. Mackie434 that such a sanction was available
422. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 171.
423. FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
424. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 934 F.2d 1064, 1069
(9th Cir. 1991); Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 1975).
425. 830 S.W.2d at 624.
426. Id. at 625.
427. Id.
428. Long v. Knox, 155 Tex. 581, 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (1956).
429. 825 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
430. Id. at 488.
431. Id.
432. 824 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, n.w.h.).
433. In contrast, TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(5) expressly authorizes a court to strike a party's
pleadings for failure to comply with a discovery request or order. See also TEX. R. Civ. P.
215(3) (authorizing a trial court to impose any sanction authorized by rule 215(2) for abuse of
the discovery process).
434. 796 S.W.2d 700, 703-04 & n.l (Tex. 1990).
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under appropriate circumstances. 435 The court also held, however, that the
standards for review of discovery sanctions announced in TransAmerican
Natural Gas Corp. v. Powel1436 applied equally to sanctions imposed for vio-
lation of other pretrial orders.437 Under TransAmerican, sanctions for dis-
covery abuse must be just and appropriate.438 In addition, the imposition of
severe sanctions is limited by the requirements of constitutional due pro-
cess.439 After finding no evidence in the record that appellant had acted in
flagrant bad faith or with callous disregard for the order in limine, the court
in Lassiter concluded that the harsh sanction selected by the trial court did
not comport with the requirements of due process.440 Accordingly, it re-
versed the trial court's judgment as an abuse of discretion.44
4. Referral to Mediation
Section 154.021(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code autho-
rizes a trial court on its own motion to refer a suit to alternative dispute
resolution. 442 The court may not refer the dispute to mediation, however, if
a party objects to the procedure on a reasonable basis. 443 Moreover, the
mediator appointed by the court may not compel the parties to negotiate or
coerce them to enter into a settlement agreement. 4" On the basis of these
provisions, the court in Decker v. Lindsay445 held that a trial court did not
abuse its discretion in ordering the parties to mediation over the objection of
the plaintiff. According to the court, one party's mere belief that mediation
will not resolve a lawsuit does not constitute a reasonable basis for objec-
tion. 4 6 Nevertheless, the court held that the order of referral in Decker was
void inasmuch as it required the parties to actually negotiate in good faith
and attempt to reach a settlement. 447 In this respect, concluded the court,
the order violated the open courts provision 448 of the Texas Constitution.449
435. 824 S.W.2d at 669.
436. 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991), discussed in 1992 Annual Survey, supra note 23, at 1396-
97.
437. 824 S.W.2d at 670.
438. 811 S.W.2d at 916-17. In order to be "just," the sanction must not be excessive and a
direct relationship must exist between the offensive conduct and the sanctions imposed. Id.
439. Id. at 917-18.
440. 824 S.W.2d at 670.
441. Id.
442. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
443. Id. § 154.022(c).
444. Id. § 154.053(a).
445. 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
446. Id.
447. Id. at 252.
448. Tex. Const. art. I, § 13.
449. 824 S.W.2d at 251. The court refused to address plaintiff's contention that the entire
ADR statute was unconstitutional, however, because plaintiff's brief failed to present any argu-
ment or authorities supporting that contention. Id.
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